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778 KNIGHT t1. KAISER Co. [48 C.2d 
(S. F. No. 19697. In Bank. June 28,1957.] 
HELEN KNIGHT, Appellant, v. KAISER COMPANY 
(a Corporation), Respondent. 
(1] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Facts are 
V'ndisputed.-Where the facts are undisputed, it is a question 
of law whether the facts alleged fall within the scope of the 
attractive nuisance doctrine. 
(2] ld.-Care Toward Licensees.-Generally, where a person goes 
on the premises of another without invitation as a bare licensee 
and the owner passively acquiesces in his presence, if any in-
jury is sustained by the licensee by reason of a mere defect in 
the premises the owner is not liable for negligence, since the 
licensee has assumed the risk himself. 
[3] ld.-Care Toward Licensees.-An owner of property does not 
assume any duty to one who is on his premises by permission 
only and as a mere licensee, except for wanton or willful in-
jury inflicted on the licensee while on the premises. 
[4] ld.-Duty Toward Infants-Attractive Nuisancee.-In the 
absenoe of circumstances which bring a case under the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine, an owner of land owes no other duty 
to a child trespassing on his preruises than he owes to an adult 
trespasser, but if the owner maintains on his land what is 
commonly called an "attractive nuisance," he is liable for in· 
juries resulting to a trespassing child. 
[5&,5b] ld.-Duty Toward Infants-Attractive Nuisances-Sand 
Pilee.-A sand pile is not an attractive nuisance j it may be 
attractive to children, but it is also of a common and ordinary 
nature and is found in numerous places, quite frequently in a 
child's own backyard, and an owner of private property who 
maintains thereon a sand pile that merely duplicates the work 
of nature and to which no new dangers have been added should 
not be liable to a trespassing child for injuries under the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine. 
[6] ld.-Duty Toward Infants-Attractive Nuisances-Pools of 
Water.-A body of water, natural or artificial, does not con· 
stitute an attractive nuisance that will subject the owner to 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 97 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 104 et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 164 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 142 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 163; [2,3] Negligence, 
§ 69; [4] Negligence, ~§ 80, 81; [5] Negligence, § 88 j [6] Negli-
gence, § 88 (2); [7] Negligence, § 81; [8] Negligence, § 110. 
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liability for trespassing children who are attracted thereto 
and are drowned. 
[7] Id.-Duty Toward Infants-Attractive Nuisances.-The gen-
eralJy accepted rule is to restrict and limit, rather than to 
extend, the doctrine of attractive nuisance; such doctrine is 
to be applied cautiously and only when the facts come strictly 
and fully within the rule. 
[8] Id.-Pleading-Complaints for Injuries by Attractive Nul-
SaDces.-In an action for wrongful death of a child who was 
asphyxiated when the sand pile on defendant's property on 
which he was playing collapsed, assuming that a conveyor belt 
adjacent to such sand pile might constitute an attractive nui-
sance, in the absence of an allegation of a causll} connection 
between the conveyor belt and the child's death the mainte-
nance of such belt did not bring the case under the attractive 
nuisance doctrine. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. James R. Agee, Judge. AffiJ'D\ed. 
Action for damages for wrongful dcath. Judgment for de-
fendant on sustaining demurrer to third amended complaint 
without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Charles O. Morgan, Jr., for Appellant. 
Frederick M. Van Sidden and James O. Oalkins for Be-
spondellt. 
McCOMB, J.-From a judgment predicated upon the sus-
taining of defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's third amended 
complaint without leave to amend in an action to recover 
damages for the death of plaintiff's son, plaintiff appeals. 
The amended complaint, in substance, alleged that plain-
tiff was the natural mother of decedent, Johnny William 
Bass, Jr., 10 years of age; that defendant owned and main-
tained premises in Stockton on which it had placed or caused 
to he placed large piles of sand and gravel and, adjacent 
thereto, a large conveyor belt; that no fences, guards or rail-
ings were placed around these sand and gravel piles or a por-
tion of the conveyor belt i that a road or pathway was close 
to these objects and children were in the habit of playing 
upon the sand and gravel piles and the conveyor belt; that 
defendant knew or should have known the conditions existing 
involved an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm 
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------------------------------------------------------l on August 20, 1958, plaintilf's IOn, while playing upon the' 
premises and digging in one of the Mnd piles, was asphyxiated 
when it collapsed upon him.1 
'The mate~l partit of the amended complaint are .. folloWII: "IV. 
That at all times herein mentioned the defendant. owned, maintained, 
operated and controlled thoBe certain premiBes located in the City of 
Stockton, County of Ban Joaquin, State of California, and more com-
monly bown and designated aB the 1100 Block, North Union Street, 
Stockton, California. 
"V. That prior to and on or about the lOth day of Auguat, 1953 
the defendants had placed or cauBed to be placed and had maintained or 
caused to be maintained large 88.Ild and gravel piles and a large COD' 
veyor belt on the &aid 1100 Block, North Union Street, all of which were 
adjacent to each other, and no fences, guards or railings were placed 
around said 88.Ild or gravel piles or around a portion of the lIaid conveyor 
belt; that in addition thereto there was a road, or pathway, proceeding 
along side the said sand and gravel piles aud the &aid conveyor. That 
ehildren of tender age were in the habit of being upon and playing 
upon the said premises and the said 88.Ild and gravel piles and conveyor 
belt, and by the ordinary predileetions and impulBes of normal children 
were attracted to and induced to come and to be upon and to play upon 
the &aid premises, &aid Band and gravel piles and conveyor belt; all of 
which WaB well bown to the defendants, its Bervants, agents and em· 
ployees, or by the exercise of reasonable care on their part would have 
been known to them. That the defendants knew and realized, or should 
have known and realized, that the Baid sand piles, gravel piles and con· 
veyor involved an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to 
children playing on the Bame aB aforesaid in that the children could be 
injured or killed from falling from the same, from the same falling upon 
them and in other manners and ways. 
"That &aid children because of their youth were 'unable to and did 
not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling 
in said condition or coming within the area made dangerous by the same. 
That a fence, guard or railing would have prevented said cbildren from 
coming upon and being upon said premises and condition and from inter· 
meddling in same. 
"VI. That on or about the 20th day of August, 1953, at or about 
'1:20 P. lI:. of said day, the said Johnny William Bass, Jr., having been 
attracted to and induced to come upon and be upon and to play upon 
the eaid premises, the said sand and gravel piles and tbe said conveyor 
belt aB afore&aid, WaB !llaying upon the same, and being of the age of 
ten (10) years and being of tender and immature years and by reason 
of his age and immaturity, being unable to perceive or appreciate the 
danger confronting bim and without fault on bis part was situated and 
playing as aforesaid. That at said time and place the defendants, and 
eacb of them, did carelessly and negligently maintain, operate and con· 
trol the Baid premises owned by the defende.nts and known and desig· 
nated as the 1100 Block of North Union Street, in that the said de· 
fendants negligently and carelessly failed to place any fences, guards 
or railings. or other means of excluding small cbildren from the arell 
around eaid sand or gravel piles or around a portion of the said con· 
veyor belt. That by reason of the negligence and carelessness of the 
defendants, and eacb of them, as aforesaid, and as a proximate result 
thereof, the said Johnny William Bass, Jr., while playing and digging 
on and in the same piles was asphyxiated, resulting in his death, when 
one of said sand piles collapsed upon him while .he WaB playing and 
~~in£ on or in t,be same. " 
) 
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Plain~ eontends that the facts alleged in the eomplaint 
as amended state a cause of action within the "attractive 
nuisance" doctrine. This contention is untenable. 
[1] Where the facts are undisputed, as in the instant ease, 
it is a question of law whether or not the facts alleged fall 
within the scope of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. 
(NicoZoIi v. Cla-rk, 169 Cal. 746, 747 et seq. [147 P. 971, L.R.A. 
1915F 638]; Hernandez .v. Santiago Orange Grower, AIIn., 
110 Cal.App. 229, 236 [4] [293 P. 875]; cf. Loftus v. De1w.il, 
133 Cal. 214, 218 [65 P. 379].) 
Applying this rule to the admitted facts in the present ease, 
it is conceded that defendant maintained upon its premises 
large sand and gravel piles and a large conveyor belt; that 
decedent while playing and digging in one of the sand piles 
was asphyxiated when it collapsed upon him. 
[2J It is the general rule that where a person goes upon 
the premises of another without invitation, as a bare licensee, 
and the owner passively acquiesces in his presence, if any 
injury is sustained by the licensee by reason of a mere defect 
in the premises the owner is not liable for negligence, for the 
licensee has assumed the risk himself. [3] The owner of 
property does not assume any duty to one who is on his prem-
ises by permission only and as a mere licensee, except for 
wanton or willful injury inflicted upon the licensee while on 
the premises. (Means v. Southern Oalif. By. 00. 144 Cal. 
473,479 [77 P.l00l, 1 Ann.Cas. 206] ; Ward v. Oakley 00.,125 
Cal.App.2d 840, 844 [1] [271 P.2d 536] ; Fisher v. General 
Petro Oorp., 123 Cal.App.2d 770, 777 [5] [267 P.2d 841J; 
Koppelman V. Ambassador Hotel 00., 35 Cal.App.2d 537, 
540 [2] [96 P.2d 196] ; Herzog V. Hemphill, 7 Cal.App. 116, 
118 [93 P. 899].) 
[4] The law is also established that in the absence of eir-
cumstances which bring a case under the "attractive nui-
sance" doctrine, an owner of land owes no other duty to a child 
trespassing on his premises than he owes to an adult tres-
passer. (Peters V. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 349 [47 P. 113, 
598, 56 Am.St.Rep. 106].) 
To the general rule there is this exception: If an owner 
of land maintains thereon what is commonly called an .. at-
tractive nuisance," the owner is liable for injuries resulting 
to a trespassing child. (See Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), 
pp. 438 et seq.; Sanchez V. East Oontra Oosta 1r,.. 00., 205 
Cal. 5]5, 5]8 [2] J271 P. 1060].) 
[5a] In view of the foregoing rules and the facts alleged 
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in the complaint, this question is pr~sented: Does a sand pt1e 
constitute an "attractive nuisance," i.e., a fact which places 
liability upon the owner of property for injuries to a trespass-
ing child,2 
This question must be answered in the negative. [6] It 
is settled that a body of water, natural or artificial, does not 
constitute an "attractive nuisance" that will subject the 
owner to liability for trespassing children who are attracted 
thereto and are drowned. (Peters v. Bowman, supra, pp. 347 
et seq.; Ward v. Oakley Co., supra, p. 845 [2J ; Demmer v. City 
of Eureka, 78 Cal.App.2d 708, 710 [1] [178 P.2d 472].) 
As far as attractiveness to children is concerned, there is 
no Ilignificant difference between a body of water and a sand 
pile. Pools of water and sand piles duplicate the work of 
nature and are not uncommon. In fact, a pool of water is 
far more dangerous than a sand pile, which in and of itself 
is not dangerous. The dangers connected with and inherent 
in a sand pile are obvious to everyone, even to a child old 
enough to be permitted by its parents to play unattended. 
[5b] Sand piles may be attractive to children, but they 
are also of a common and ordinary nature and are found in 
numerous places, quite frequently in the child's own backyard. 
It is common for children to play in sand plIes and to dig 
holes and make excavations in them. They are early in-
structed by their parents as to the danger of cave-ins. Hence, 
the owner of private property who maintains thereon a sand 
pile that merely duplicates the work of nature and to which 
no new dangers have been added should not be liable to a 
trespassing child for injuries under the" attractive nuisance" 
doctrine. 
In Restatement of the Law of Torts, volume 2, section 339, 
page 922, it is said that the duty of the possessor of land 
•• does not extend to those conditions the existence of which 
is obvious even to children and the risk of which is fully 
realized by them. This limitation of the possessor's liability 
to conditions dangerous to children, because of their inability 
to appreciate their surroundings or to realize the risk in-
volved therein, frees the possessor of land from the danger of 
liability to which he would otherwise be subjected by main-
taining on the land the normal, necessary and usual imple-
ments which are essential to its normal use but which reck-
less children can, uSe to their harm in a spirit of bravado or to 
-see Proaer on Torte (lid eel. 1(55), "'pro. 
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gratify some other childish desire and with as full a percep-
tion of the risks which they are running as though they were 
adults." (OJ. 28 A.L.R.2d (1953), § 4, p. 200.) 
In Anderson v. Reith-Riley Oonst. 00., 112 Ind.App. 170 
[44 N.E.2d 184], defendant removed a large amount of sand 
from its property, leaving a hole 100 feet long, 50 feet wide 
and 10 feet deep, with perpendicular walls. Plaintiff's son, 
nine years of age, was attracted to the hole, where he ex-
cavated below the surface and was killed in a cave-in which 
followed. The court held that defendant was not liable under 
the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, saying at page 185: 
"Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract 
children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of 
drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed 
so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger 
that if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool 
on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature 
without adding any new danger, and a child, without invita-
tion, ventures on the private property, enters the pool and is 
drowned, the owner is not liable because of having created an 
'attractive nuisance.' 
"Nature has created cliffs and embankments which attraet 
children. And here again is always the danger of falling over 
the cliffs or down the embankments. Against these dangers 
children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently 
presumed to know the danger that if the owner of private 
property by excavating for a basement on his own property, 
thereby creates an artificial cliff, and a child, without invita-
tion, ventures on the private property and falls into the ex-
cavation, the owner is not liable because of having created 
an 'attractive nuisance.' 
"Another common danger in cliffs and embankments is that 
of cave-ins from excavation below the surface. And it is com-
mon for children in play to make such excavations in the 
sides of cliffs and embankments for the purpose of creating 
caves, tunnels, etc. So theY are early instructed 88 to the 
danger of cave-ins and are sufficiently presumed to know the 
danger that if the owner of private property by excavating on 
his own property, creates an artificial cliff or embankment, 
merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any 
new dangers, and a child, without invitation, ventures on the 
private property, excavates below the surface and is injured 
or killed by a resultant cave-in, the owner is not liable because 
of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' Nor does the rule 
) 
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change with the varying texture of the earth. The danger is 
the same danger, real and obvious, with only the percentage 
of probability of the occurrence increased or decreased with 
the earth's fineness or firmness. 
"The essence of the rule that the doctrine of attractive nui-
sance does not apply to cases where the danger is one which 
is obvious and common to nature, against which children are 
presumed to have received early instruction, was recognized 
by our Supreme Court in the case of Oity of EvansviUe v. 
Blue (1937),212 Ind. 130 [8 N.E.2d 224, 229]. There a boy 
of 11 was drowned in a municipal swimming poo1. Justice 
Fansler speaking for the court said: 
"'Healthy boys of eleven years and younger must be 
deemed to know the perils of deep water, and it must be recog-
nized that it is in the nature of boys to venture where it is 
dangerous. But it is none the less negligent for one who 
is not a good swimmer to venture into deep water, and, ordi-
narily, boys no more than adults may voluntarily and negli-
gently put themselves in a position of known danger and 
charge others with responsibility for protecting them agaiust 
their own voluntary acts.' " 
In Puckett v. Oity of Louisville, 273 Ky. 349 [116 S.W.2d 
627], plaintiff instituted an action against defendant city 
for injuries sustained by plaintiff's 11-year-old child, who had 
gone upon defendant's lot containing a hole about four feet 
deep. The child undermined the embankment with a spoon, 
causing it to cave in and injure her. The court held that 
defendant was not liable under the "attractive nuisance" 
doctrine. 
In Zagar v. Union Pac. R. 00., 107 Kan. 240 [214 P. 107J, 
it was held that defendant was not liable for injuries to a 
boy 13~ years of age who was injured as the result of earth 
falling upon him from a cave dng on defendant's land by 
other boys. The" attractive nuisance" doctriue was held 
not applicable to these facts. (See p. 109.) 
It is thus evident that the sand pile did not constitute an 
"attractive nuisance." [7] This conclusion is in accord 
with the generally accepted rule,-to restrict and limit, rather 
than to extend, the doctrine of "attractive nuisance." It is 
a doctrine to be applied cautiously and only when the facts 
come strictly and fully within the rule. (See Lake v. Ferrer, 
139 Cal.App.2d 114, 117 [3] [293 P.2d 104); 65 C.J.S. 
(1950), § 29(14), p.K79.) 
[8] Finally, it is to be noted that if it is conceded that 
) 
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the conveyor belt mentioned in the pleading might constitute 
an "attractive nuisance," there is no allegation that it caused 
or contributed to decedent's death. There is a total absence 
of an allegation of a causal connection between the conveyor 
belt and his unfortunate death. Under these circumstances, 
the maintenance of the conveyor belt does not bring the case 
under the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. (Wara v. Oakky 
Co., supra, p. 846 [5].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., eoncurrecL 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The Civil Code, section 1714, provides: "Everyone is re-
sponsible, not only for the result of his willfUl acts, but also 
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary 
care or skill in the management of his property or person, 
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordi-
nary care, brought the injury upon himself." Nevertheless, 
the cases are replete with statements that an occupier of real 
property owes no such general duty of care to trespassers 
and bare licensees. With respect to adults we need not pause 
to determine how many of such statements constitute no 
more than a determination by the court that the defendant 
was not negligent at all or that the plaintiff assumed the risk 
or was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Clearly the fact that the plaintiff is a trespasser or a bare 
licensee is relevant to the question what precautions the 
reasonable man would take to protect him. In many cases 
there may be no reason to foresee trespassing, and a reason-
able man ordinarily may be entitled to assume that those 
entering without right or by mere permission will not ex-
pect special precautions to be taken for their benefit and will 
accordingly exercise greater care for their own safety. More-
over, the rules dealing with the duty of land occupiers to the 
various classes of entrants .on' the land make clear that in 
this area courts have frequently exercised their power to 
establish specific standards of negligence instead of leaving 
the matter under more general instructions to the jury. It 
cannot be denied, however, that in the case of adult tres-
passers and licensees the operation of no-duty rules has in 
many instances resulted in immunity for conduct that un-
reasonably endangered the plaintiff and was therefOl'e negli-
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and the rule set forth in section 1114 is not now before us. In \ 
t?e ease of tresp~ing children. a review of . the better con-
sIdered cases conVInces me that It does not eXIst. . 
In Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal. 296 [27 P. 666, \ 
~5 Am.St.Rep. 186], this court followed the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Sioux City &: Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, \ 
17 Wall (U.S.) 657 [21 L.Ed. 745], by solving the problem 
of the land occupier's liability to trespassing children for \ 
dangerous conditions maintained on the premises in terms of 
ordinary negligence principles. It pointed out that it could II 
not recognize a rule that no duty was owed to trespassing 
children without departing from well-settled principles. "It I 
is a maxim of the law that one must so use and enjoy his . 
property as to interfere with the comfort and safety of 
others as little as possible, consistently with its proper use. 
This rule, which only imposes a just restriction upon the 
owner of property, seems not to have been given due con-
sideration in the case referred to. [Frost v. Eastern R. R. 
Co., 64 N.H. 220 [9 A. 790], invoked by defendant.] But 
this principle as a standard of conduct is of universal applica-
tion, and the failure to observe it is, in respect to those who 
have a right to invoke its protection, a breach of daty, aud 
in a legal sense, constitutes negligence. Whether, in any 
given case, there has been such negligence upon the part of the 
owner of property, in the maintenance thereon of dangerous 
machinery, is a question of fact dependent upon the situation 
of the property and the attendant circumstances, because 
upon such facts will depend the degree of care which prudence 
would suggest as reasonably necessary to guard others against 
injury therefrom; 'for negligence in a legal sense is no more 
than this: the failure to observe, for the protection of the 
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, 
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, where~ 
by such other person suffers injury.' (Cooley on Torts, 630.) 
The question of defendant 'Il negligence in this case was a 
matter to be decided by the jury, in view of all the evidence, 
and with reference to this general principle as to the duty 
of the defendant. If u(:'fendant ought reasonably to hl:lve 
auticipated that leaving this turn-table unguarded and ex-
posed, an injury such as plaintiff suffered was lik(:'ly to occur, 
then it Inllst be held to have anticipated it, and was guilty 
of negligence in thus maintaining it in its exposed position. 
It is no answer to this to say that the child was a trespasser, 
and if it had not intermeddled with defendant's property it 
) 
) 
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would not have been hurt, and that the law imposes no duty 
upon the defendant to make its premises a safe playing-ground 
for children. In the forum of law, as well as of common 
sense, a child of immature years is expected to exercise only 
such care and self-restraint as belongs to childhood, and a 
reasonable man must be presumed to know this, and required 
to govern his actions accordingly. It is a matter of common 
experience that children of tender years are guided in their 
actions by childish instincts, and are lacking in that discre-
tion which is ordinarily sufficient to enable those of more 
mature years to appreciate and avoid danger, and in propor-
tion to this lack of judgment on their part, the care which 
must be observed toward them by others is increased." (91 
Cal. at 301-303.) 
To recognize such a duty of care toward trespassing ehil-
dren does not impose an unreasonable burden on the defend-
ant, and "it must be kept in mind that it requires nothing of 
the owner that a man of oruinary care and prudence would 
not do of his own volition, under like circumstances. Such 
a mall would not willingly take up unreasonable burdens, 
nor vex himself with intolerable restrictions." (Chicago, B. 
& Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 89 [91 N.W. 880, 882].) 
"The owner of a thing dangerous and attractive to children 
is not always anu universally liable for an injury to a child 
tempted by the attraction. His liability bears a relation to 
the character of the thing, whether natural and common, or 
artificial and uncommon, to the comparative ease or difficulty 
of preventing the danger without destroying or impairing the 
usefulness of the thing, and, in short, to the reasonableness 
and propriety of his own conduct, in tJ'iew of all surrounding 
circumstances and conditions. As to common dangers existing 
in the order of nature, it is the duty of parents to guard and 
warn their children, and, failing to do 110, they should not 
expect to hold others responsible for their own want of care. 
But, with respect to dangers specinlly created by the act of 
the owner, novel in charlicter, attractive and dangerous to 
children, easily guarded and rendered safe, the rule is, as it 
ought to be, different; and such is the rule of the turntable 
cases, of the lumher-pile cases, and others of similar character. 
But the o,mer of a thing dangerous and attractive to children 
is not always culpable, and therefore is not always liable for 
au injury to a child drawn into danger by the attraction. It 
is necessary to 'discriminate between the cases in Which culpa-
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rehearing in Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 356 [47 P. 113, 
598, 58 Am.St.Rep. 106]. Italics added.) 
As Chief Justice Beatty stated such culpability turns on 
"the reasonableness and propriety of" the defendant's" con-
duct, in view of all surrounding circumstances and condi-
tions," or, in other words, it is determined by applying fa-
miliar negligence standards. (Accord: Gimmestad v. Rose 
Bros. 00., 194 Minn. 531 [261 N.W. 194, 196]; Wolfe v. 
Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110 [193 A. 608, 609-610]; Foster v. 
Lusk, 129 Ark. 1 [194 S.W. 855, 856] ; Kahn v. James Burton 
00., 51 Ill. 614 [126 N.E.2d 836, 841-842].) Section 339 of 
the Restatement of Torts has defined these standards by stat-
ing four cO:lditions that must be satisfied to impose liability 
on a possessor of land for injury to trespassing children 
caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land. 
Liability exists if "(a) the place where the condition is main-
tained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know 
that such children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condi-
tion is one of which the pos::;eS30r knows or should know and 
which he realizes or ahould realize as involving an unreason-
able risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, 
and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover 
the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling 
in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and 
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition 
is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved 
therein." Tnis section was cited with approval in Melendez 
v. City of Los Angele:;, 8 Ca1.2d 741 [68 P.2d 971), and has 
frequently been held to be in accord with the law of this state. 
(Woods v. City &7 County of San Francisco, 148 Cal.App.2d 
958, 962-963 [307 P.2d 698] ; Edler v. Sepulveda Park Apts., 
141 Cal.App.2d 675, 680 [297 P.2d 50£]; Lopez v. Capitol 
00., 141 Cal.App.2d 60, 66 [296 P.2d 63] ; Marino v. Valenti, 
118 Cal.App.2d 830, 842 [259 P.2d 84]; Long v. Standc.rd 
Oil 00., 92 Cal.App.2d 455, 464 [207 P.2d 837].) 
In the present case the allegations of plaintiff's complaint 
satisfy the foregoing requirements. It iG alleged that de-
fendant maintained large sand and gravel piles and a large 
conveyor belt on its property adjacent to a public street. 
"[C]hildren of tender age were in the habit of •.. playing 
upon ... the said sand and gravel piles and conveyor belt," 
which was known or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have been known ,to·defendant. Defendant "knew and real-
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piles, gravel piles and conveyor involved an unreasonable risk 
of death or serious bodily harm to children playing on the 
same as aforesaid in that the children could be injured or 
killed from falling from the same, from the same falling upon 
them and in other manners and ways ...• [S)aid children 
because of their youth were unable to and did not discover 
the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in 
said condition or coming within the area made dangerous by 
the same." No fences, guards, or railings were "placed around 
said sand or gravel piles or around a portion of the said 
conveyor belt," but "a fence guard or railing would have 
prevented said children from coming upon and being upon 
said premises and condition and from intermeddling in same." 
Plaintiff's son, "having been attracted to and induced to 
come upon and be upon and to play upon the said premises, 
the said sand and gravel piles and the said conveyor belt as 
aforesaid, wa:; playing upon the same, and being of the age of 
ten (10) years and being of tender and immature years and 
by reason of his age and immaturity, being unable to per-
ceive or appreciate the danger confronting him and without 
fault on his part was situated and playing as aforesaid. tt As 
a proximate result of defendant's negligent failure to place 
any fences, guards or railings or other means of excluding 
small children from the area, plaintiff's son "'while playing 
and digging on and in the . . . piles was asphyxiated, re-
sulting in his death, when one of said sand piles collapsed 
upon him while he was playing and digging on or in the 
same." 
Despite the apparent sufficiency of these allegations, the 
majority opinion holds that the complaint does not state a 
cause of actien on the ground that a sand pile does not con-
stitute ar attraetive nuisance. This holding necessarily either 
departR £l'om the g,!D!ral principles governing liability to 
trespassing children by adopting a special sand-pile rule, or 
is' based on the tecit taking of judicial notice of facts with 
respect to children and sand piles contrary to those alleged 
in the complaint. It cannot be justified on either ground. 
There are no e5~Rb1if;.led precedents in this state dealing with 
sand piles, as there are with respect to bodies of water, that 
might, under the doctrir.e of stare decisis, justify adhering to 
a rigid rule without regard to the facts of the particular case. 
Precedent-wise we are free to follow the general principles 
governing liabil~t'" to trespassing children. In pur'porting to 
do 80, the majority opinion states that "sand piles duplicate 
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the work of nature and are not uncommon," and that "The 
dangers connected with and inherent in a sand pile are ob-
vious to everyone, even to a child old enough to be permitted 
by its parents to play unattended." There is no basis, how-
ever, for conc1uqing that every sand pile necessarily dupli-
cates the work of nature or holding as a matter of law that 
no defendant should reasonably foresee that the dangers con-
nected with and inherent in its sand pile are not obvious to 
children old enough to be permitted to play unattended. Al-
though Anderson v. Reith-mley Const. Co., 112 Ind.App. 
170 [44 N.E.2d 184], supports the majority's position, the 
other cases cited in the majority opinion may be explained on 
their particular facts. Moreover, authority contrary to the 
Anderson case is not lacking. (Hawley v. City of Atlantic, 
92 Iowa 172 [60 N.W. 519, 520J ; Baxter v. Park, 48 S.D. 506 
[205 N.W. 75, 76J; see Holmberg v. City of Chicago, 244 
Ill.App. 505, 510-512; 28 A.L.R.2d 195, 198.) 
Whether the maintenance of a sand pile can give rise 
to liability for harm to trespassing children must necessarily 
turn on the facts of the particular case. Children accus-
tomed to playing in sand piles in their own yards may be 
totally unfamiliar with the hazards of a large pile main-
tained for industrial purposes. The very harmlessness of the 
familiar small pile may lull them into a sense of security. 
Nor are all children reared in such proximity to natural bluffs, 
cliffs, caves, and large sand duues that they may be presumed 
to be familiar with them or to have been warned of their 
characteristics by their parents. Thus even if it could be as-
sumed that the sand piles in this case duplicated natural sand 
piles, we could not judicially notice that plaintiff's child 
should necessarily have been aware of their hazards. Dean 
Prosser has pointed out that many" courts have said that the 
doctrine does not apply to common conditions, or to natural 
conditions of the land, or that it is limited to latent dangers, 
or to highly dangerous conditions, or to special aud unusual 
conditions of modern industry; but all such statements ap-
pear to be made with reference to the particular case, and 
to be directed at nothing more than the existence of a recog-
nizable and unreasonable risk of harm to children." (Prosser 
on Torts. 2d ed., § 76, p. 443.) Professors Harper and James 
state: "In addition to the probability of trespass. the dan-
gerous condition of the premises must be produced by man, 
and either creJlted or maintained by the occupier. This re-
quirement stems from the law's reluctance to impose purely 
) 
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affirmative obligations on a man. It is sometimes said that 
man-made conditions which merely reproduce natural ones 
stand on the same footing. But if there is to be exemption 
here it must obviously rest on a different basis. That basis 
may often be found in the fact that children are likely to ap-
preciate the risks of natural dangers, such as water, fire, 
or high places, so that these conditions are not highly dan-
gerous to them. But this is not always the case. Some natural 
conditions have more concealed danger than a turntable, and 
if a landowner reproduces such a 'natural trap,' liability 
should not be excluded. Given affirmative arrangement of the 
premises, the touchstone of liability should be unreasonable 
probability of harm. All other criteria should be used as 
guides only, and not erected into rigid rules." (2 Harper 
and James, Law of Torts, § 27.5, pp. 1452-1453.) 
The evil of creating rigid rules is demonstrated by some 
of the California cases dealing with bodies of water. Since 
ordinarily it may be presumed that children are aware of the 
dangers of drowning and since frequently the burden of 
adequately protecting children from that risk is out of propor-
tion to it, usually the maintenance of a body of water should 
not give rise to liability. (See Peter8 v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 
345 [47 P. 113, 598, 58 Am.St.Rep. 106] ; Melendez v. City 
of Los Angele8, 8 Cal.2d 741 [68 P.2d 971) ; Beeson v. Oity 
of Los Angeles, 115 Cal.App. 122 [300 P. 993) ; King v. Simons 
Brick 00., 52 Cal.App.2d 586 [126 P.2d 627); Demmer Y. 
Oity of Eureka, 78 Cal.App.2d 708 [178 P.2d 472] ; Polk Y. 
Laurel Hill Oemetery Assn., 37 Cal.App. 624 [174 P. 414) ; 
Betts v. Oity &- County of San Francisco, 108 Cal.App.2d 701 
[239 P.2d 456); Ward v. Oakley 00., 125 Cal.App.2d 840 
[271 P.2d 536] ; Reardon v. Spring Valley Water 00., 68 Cal. 
App. 13 [228 P. 406).) Blindly, however, the rule appro-
priate for the usual case has been extended to the unusual 
case unless there was something abnormal about the body of 
water itself. (See Sanchez v. East Contra Costa lrr~ 00., 
205 Cal. 515 [271 P. 1060] ; Long v. Standard Oil 00., supra, 
92 Cal.App.2d 455.) Thus recovery has been denied on the 
pleadings for the death of very young children who could 
not be presumed to appreciate the danger despite allegations 
sufficient to justify recovery under general principles and 
where the facts alleged did not indicate that the burden of 
protecting such children outweighed the risk to them. (W il-
ford v. Little, 144' Cal.App.2d 477 [301 P.2d 282] ; Lake Y. 
Ferrer, 139 Cal.App.2d 114 [293 P.2d 104].) In nonwater 
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cases, on the other hand, the error of rigid categorization has 
been recognized and avoided. (W oods v. Oity & Oounty of 
San Francisco, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 958, 963-965 [307 
P.2d 698] ; Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal.App. 196, 200 [290 P. 
465]; Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Min. 00., 
45 Cal.App. 194, 204 [187 P. 101].) This conflict 
should be resolved by disapproving the former cases. In 
any event the error of those cases should not be extended. 
As stated in the Faylor case, "while matching cases is an 
interesting mental recreation, it is not by matching cases, 
but by the correct application of sound legal principles, that 
a case such as this is best determined .••. " (45 Cal.App. at 
204.) "The naming or labeling of a certain set of facts as 
being an 'attractive nuisance' case or a 'turntable' case has 
often led to undesirable conclusions. The inclination is then 
to find a stare decisis pigeonhole or category. The difficulty in 
such procedure is that too often the result of such a search 
is the reaching of irreconcilable conclusions .•.. [T]he only 
proper basis for decision in such cases dealing with personal 
injuries to children are the customary rules of ordinary negli-
gence cases." (Kahn v. James Burton 00., supra, 51 Ill. 614 
[126 N.E. 2d 836, 841].) 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 24, 
1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
